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OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge
The government appeals the district court’s grant of
Delores Weaver’s motion in limine. The order precluded the
government from introducing a recorded telephone conversation
in its case-in-chief. For the following reasons, we will vacate
the order and remand.1
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 2

1

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 3731. Our review of the district court’s
interpretation of the Rules of Evidence is plenary. We review
the court’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Cruz,
910 F.2d 1072, 1081 (3d Cir. 1990).
2

A detailed overview of the underlying conspiracy is
described in detail in Judge Ambro’s related opinion in United
States v. Ali, No. 05-2098. [cite will be added]. Accordingly,
rather than again detailing that background here, we will refer
only to those facts that pertain to issues Weaver is raising.
2

The government’s allegations include averments that
Faridah Ali, the assistant director of the Sister Clara Mohammed
School (the “School”), and Delores Weaver, the director of the
Adult Basic Education (“ABE”) program at the Community
College of Philadelphia (“CCP”), devised a scheme to defraud
CCP out of rental payments to the School by representing that
they were providing ABE classes that were never taught and
then splitting payments CCP sent to compensate the School for
those nonexistent classes.

To help establish Weaver’s

involvement in the scheme, the government wanted to introduce
a conversation between Faridah Ali and her sister, Zaynah
Rasool, that occurred on September 4, 2001 (the “September 4
conversation”).
During the September 4 conversation, Ali and Rasool
discussed various administrative matters at the School,
commented on some of the School’s faculty, and talked about
the School’s arrangement with CCP.

Ali also made the

following comments about Sayeeda Quaye, a teacher at the
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School: “[S]he got paid for all summer from [CCP].” This statement
prompted Rasool to respond: “[S]he ain’t did nothing.”

Ali

continued: “[A]lways people gonna be backbiting us as much as we
do for them.”
The conversation then turned to Weaver. Ali complained as
follows that Weaver had not put her on CCP’s payroll: “Delores is .
. . just like you said, she does not want me . . . to have more than her.
And now that I bought this big car, I’m gonna have to pay for it.”
The discussion continued:
Ali:

Rasool:
Ali:
Rasool:
Ali:

[Weaver]’s being a B and I’m so sick of her. I’ll be so
glad when I won’t need her no more. Gonna be
asking for half of what the school get. You know
what I’m saying?
Yeah. It’s . . . petty and rotten and illegal.
Yeah.
Cause she’s already gettin’ other stuff. Uh, so I mean
come on now it ain’t no sense in just going overboard.
Right. But I just don’t want to do anything right now
with Sayeeda and them and jeopardize what we got
with the college, you know. Cause you know they be
the one’s to be calling and saying they ain’t nobody
here at this time go check the, you know what, I know
they’d do that.

App. 134-37.
Weaver filed a motion to exclude the entire September 4
conversation from trial on the grounds that she was not a party
4

to it and Rasool was not a member of the conspiracy. The court
granted the motion without holding a hearing based on the
strength of the briefs and its review of a transcript of the
September 4 conversation. The court did not accept either of the
grounds for exclusion asserted by Weaver.
Rather, the court reasoned that the September 4
conversation was inadmissible because the statements made
therein “cannot be regarded as having been made in furtherance
of the alleged conspiracy . . . .” 3 App. 2. The court also
concluded that it was difficult to extrapolate any “statement of
fact” from the conversation because “the statements seem to
constitute derogatory opinions having no conceivable value.”
Id. at 2-3. Accordingly, the court ruled that the statements were
not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).
The court then granted the government’s motion to stay
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Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides: “A statement is not hearsay
if— . . . the statement is offered against a party and is . . . a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
5

Weaver’s trial pending appeal. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Rule 801(d)(2)(E)’s “in furtherance” Requirement
The government argues that the district court erred in
ruling that the September 4 conversation was inadmissible
hearsay.

The government contends that the statements are

excepted by the hearsay rule under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).4 In order
for an out-of-court statement to meet the co-conspirator
exception:
the district court must find by a preponderance of
the evidence that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the
declarant and the party against whom the
statement is offered were members of the
conspiracy; (3) the statement was made in the
course of the conspiracy; and (4) the statement
was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Ellis, 156 F.3d 493, 496 (3d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). Other than

4

“Technically, the federal rules exclude admissions from
the definition of hearsay rather than treating them as exceptions
to the rule against hearsay.” United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d
838, 843 n.10 (3d Cir. 1984) As in Gibbs, “[f]or simplicity, we
will refer to the ‘co-conspirator exception.’” Id.
6

finding that the September 4 conversation was not in furtherance
of the conspiracy, the district court failed to make any findings
in respect to the other foundational requirements of Rule
801(d)(2)(E).
However, Weaver concedes that the district court
implicitly found “the existence of a conspiracy, that Ali and
Weaver were members of the conspiracy, and that the
[September 4 conversation took place] during the course of the
conspiracy,” Appellee’s Br. 8 n.5, and she does not contest
these implied findings.5

Rather, she argues only that the

September 4 conversation is inadmissible because it was not in
furtherance of the conspiracy and because the statements are
irrelevant, just as the district court concluded. We disagree.
Our analysis is guided by several of our prior decisions
addressing this issue. In United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238
(3d Cir. 1983), four members of a nine-person conspiracy,

5

We will therefore consider these issues waived, and will
not address them.
7

Ghassan Ammar, Judith Ammar, Marshall Stillman, and Roger
McFayden, were tried and convicted on several charges
stemming from their conspiracy to import and distribute heroin.
Two of the indicted co-conspirators, Charles Rossi and Michael
Dugan, pleaded guilty and testified for the government. The
two unindicted co-conspirators, John Welkie and Gilber Bunner,
also testified against the defendants at trial. The other three
indicted co-conspirators, Ibraham Ammar, Abedeen Ammar,
and Naim Dahabi, were fugitives when the trial began. Id. at
243. All of the conspirators who went to trial were convicted.
On appeal, Judith and Stillman challenged the admission
of certain out-of-court statements made by their co-conspirators
on the grounds that the statements were not in furtherance of the
conspiracy because they merely “constituted narratives of past
events . . . .” Id. at 252. Specifically, Judith challenged the
admissibility of Ghassan’s statements to Welkie and Rossi that
when he and Judith returned from a trip to Beirut, Lebanon to
purchase heroin they were checked at customs, but their heroin
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had not been discovered. Stillman challenged the admissibility
of Ibraham’s statements to Ghassan, Judith, and Welkie that
“Stillman owed them a lot of money for the last shipment of
heroin and would have to pay up before he could get another
package.” Id.
We rejected the defendants’ argument that the foregoing
statements were not admissible under Rule 801(d0(2)(E)
because they were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
We explained:
Statements between conspirators which provide
reassurance, serve to maintain trust and
cohesiveness among them, or inform each other
of the current status of the conspiracy further the
ends of the conspiracy and are admissible so long
as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are
met. Such statements are more than ‘mere
narratives’ of past events.
Id. at 252. (citations omitted).
We distinguished the admissible out-of-court statements
at issue there from the inadmissible out-of-court statements at
issue in United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.
1980). We explained that the statements in Provenzano “had
9

been made to non-members of the conspiracy who had no need
to know about the matters disclosed.” Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252.
Provenzano concerned the admissibility of out-of-court
statements of the defendants’ co-conspirator (and the
government’s chief witness), Ralph Picardo, about the
defendants’

involvement

in

a

labor-kickback

scheme.

Specifically, the defendants argued that statements Picardo had
made to his girlfriends, Paulette Compton and Mary Ann Hart,
and one of his employees, Alan Abromowitz, concerning (1) the
defendants’ roles in the scheme, (2) the legitimacy of a
corporation central to the scheme, (3) how two other
corporations central to the scheme were capitalized and
financed, (4) Picardo’s high regard for one of the defendants,
and (5) the fact that Picardo traveled to Florida on one of the
defendant’s orders, were inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
because those statements were not in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
However, we concluded that Picardo’s statements to
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Compton, who had been in charge of one of the businesses at
the center of the scheme while Picardo was in jail, were
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because “[i]f [she] were to
run the business, she had to know the details, and therefore,
Picardo’s telling her the sordid details was in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” Id. at 1001. Picardo’s statements to Hart and
Abramowitz were not admissible under the co-conspirator
exception. “Only if there was a reason for [them] to know these
things about the conspiracy could the statements have been in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. We further reasoned that the
statements made to Hart and Abramowitz were not in
furtherance of the conspiracy because they were “Picardo’s
errand runners. The district court made no findings, and the
Government has pointed to no evidence indicating anything
Picardo told them could have furthered the conspiracy.” Id.
In United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1984),
we rejected the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred
in admitting out-of-court statements against him because the
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statements “were mere narratives of past fact and not made to
induce conduct that would further the goals of the conspiracy .
. . .” Id. at 845. The statements at issue in Gibbs involved
conversations between Joseph Quintiliano, Charles Bilella, and
David White that implicated Stephen Gibbs (also known as
“Jake”) in a conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana.
White and Bilella both testified that Quintiliano told them that
he planned to sell the marijuana to a previous customer named
“Jake,” that “Jake” was getting impatient about receiving the
drugs, and that Quintiliano had invited “Jake” to visit him to
review plans to import the drugs.
White also testified that he met Gibbs in Philadelphia the
day after Quintiliano told him about “Jake’s” visit. Gibbs had
introduced himself as “Jake,” and Gibbs matched the description
Quintiliano had given him of “Jake.” White further testified that
Quintiliano told him that “Jake” wanted to buy the marijuana
that was being imported, but needed time to raise the money.
Finally, White testified that Quintiliano asked him if he could
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store the marijuana in his shop until “Jake” could raise the funds
to purchase the drugs. Id. at 841-42.
In rejecting Gibbs’s contention that the foregoing
statements were not in furtherance of the conspiracy, we first
observed that “[t]he in furtherance requirement is usually given
a broad interpretation.” Id. at 845. We also acknowledged that
“statements made to those who are not involved in the
conspiracy are not in furtherance of it just as casual conversation
between co-conspirators that is not intended to induce continued
involvement, or other actions that would not advance the
conspiracy, are not in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Id. (citation
omitted). However, we reasoned that this did not apply in Gibbs
because “[a]s participants in the scheme, it was important for
White and Bilella to be kept abreast of developments to induce
their continued participation and allay any fear they might have
had.” Id. at 846. We also distinguished the statements that had
been at issue in Gibbs, from those in Provenzano. We reasoned
that, unlike in Provenzano—where “the statements were made
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to persons not part of the conspiracy who had no reason to know
about the matters disclosed to them”—all of the statements in
Gibbs “were made to co-conspirators.” Id.
Weaver attempts to distinguish Ammar and Gibbs by
stressing that they involve drug conspiracies, which “by their
nature and culture are different; many of the conversations are
coded or veiled in some way, making it difficult to ascertain the
purpose or intent of the statements.”

Appellee’s Br. at 8.

Although we agree that drug-conspiracy cases may differ from
the fraudulent financial scheme alleged as the object of this
conspiracy, the legal principles applicable to evidentiary
disputes are the same. Moreover, none of the statements that we
ruled admissible in Ammar and Gibbs were “coded or veiled.”
In Ammar, the statement Judith challenged was made by
her husband to another member of the conspiracy recounting
how he and his wife outsmarted customs agents to smuggle
drugs into the country. The statement Stillman challenged was
made by one co-conspirator to other co-conspirators and
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informed them that Stillman was delinquent on payments for
drugs he had received and that he was not to be sold any more
drugs until he cleared his debt. The statements were uncoded
and could be understood by someone with no expertise in the
drug trade.
In Gibbs, Quintiliano’s statements to White identified
Gibbs as “Jake,” kept him current on “Jake’s” desire and ability
to purchase the marijuana, and arranged to store the marijuana
for sale. There is similarly nothing “coded or veiled” about
those conversations. .
Ironically, Weaver directs our attention to another drug
case, United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1986), in
arguing that “although there is no ‘talismanic formula’ for
determining the ‘in furtherance of’ requirement, the statement,
at a minimum[,] should advance the object of the conspiracy” to
be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

Appellee’s Br. 8.

However, her reliance on Reyes is unavailing.

There, a

government informant, William Ayala, was permitted to testify
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that Raul Reyes’s co-conspirator, Roberto Ramirez, told him
that Reyes was paying for, and distributing drugs. Reyes, 798
F.2d at 384.
Reyes appealed his conviction for conspiring to possess
and distribute drugs, in part, on the ground that Ramirez’s
statement to Ayala did not satisfy Rule 801(d)(2)(E)’s “in
furtherance” requirement because the government had not
established that Ramirez’s statement “both intended to promote
the conspiracy and did in fact have the effect of promoting the
conspiracy.” Id. The court of appeals rejected that argument,
expressly noting that it “reject[ed] the defendant’s proposition
that the statements must actually further the conspiracy to be
admissible.” 798 F.2d at 384 (emphasis in original). The court
reasoned that “Rule 801(d)(2)(E) . . . says statements need be ‘in
furtherance of the conspiracy,’ not that they ‘further the
conspiracy.’ It is enough that they be intended to promote the
conspiratorial objectives.” Id. (emphasis added). The court
ultimately concluded that Ramirez’s statement to Ayala was in
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furtherance of the drug conspiracy “[s]ince Ramirez’ statements
explained events important to the conspiracy to one of its
members in order to facilitate the conspiracy . . . .” Id.
We understand Weaver to be arguing that Ali’s
statements did not actually facilitate the conspiracy, and
therefore should not be admitted under Reyes. As an initial
matter, we note that we are not bound by Reyes. Moreover,
insofar as Reyes holds that “it is enough” for purposes of Rule
801(d)(2)(E)’s “in furtherance” requirement that statements “be
intended to promote the conspiratorial objectives,” we agree.
However, as Ammar makes clear, the “in furtherance”
requirement of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) can be satisfied when the
declarant merely informs a co-conspirator of the status of the
conspiracy.
B. Statements Informing about the Status of the Conspiracy
During an important part of the September 4
conversation, Ali told Rasool: “[Weaver’s] being a B and I’m so
sick of her. I’ll be so glad when I won’t need her no more.
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Gonna be asking for half of what the school get. You know what
I’m saying?” We believe the district court’s analysis of the
September 4 conversation, and the court’s conclusion that it was
inadmissible hearsay that was little more than idle gossip
comprised of “derogatory opinions having no conceivable
probative value,” was unduly influenced by the fact that Ali
referred to Weaver as a “B.” App. 2-3. However, there is
clearly more to the conversation.
If Ali had only stated that “[Weaver’s] being a B and I’m
so sick of her,” we would agree with the district court. But Ali
went on to say: “I’ll be so glad when I won’t need her no more.”
This statement informs Rasool that Ali was dependent on
Weaver for the success of the fraudulent scheme, and Ali is
lamenting that dependence. Ali also said about Weaver: “Gonna
be asking for half of what the school get.” This statement
informs Rasool that Weaver is requesting a 50% “kickback”
from the rent payments CCP allegedly made to the School.
Since Weaver was the director of the ABE program at
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CCP, it makes sense that Ali would have been dependent on her
to make sure that CCP did not discover that the School was a
sham site and that CCP continued to make rental payments to
the School. Ali was therefore informing Rasool of the “current
status of the conspiracy” when she expressed dissatisfaction
with her dependence on Weaver and explained Weaver’s request
for half of the School’s payments.
A declarant’s statement explaining the current status of
the conspiracy is “in furtherance” of that conspiracy only if the
addressee is also a co-conspirator. See Ammar, 714 F.2d at 252
(“Statements between conspirators which . . . inform each other
of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the
conspiracy . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Gibbs, 739 F.2d
at 846 (“As participants in the scheme, it was important for [the
addressees] to be kept abreast of developments to induce their
continued participation [in the conspiracy].”) (emphasis added).
The government argues that Rasool was a co-conspirator. As
noted earlier, the district court failed to conduct an evidentiary
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hearing on Weaver’s motion in limine. However, we think it
clear that, if the government can prove Rasool’s involvement in
the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence, the portion
of the September 4 conversation where Ali apprised Rasool of
the status of the conspiracy would be admissible because it
would then be “in furtherance” of the charged conspiracy.
C. Statements Concealing the Conspiracy
In United States v. Pecora, 798 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1986),
defendants challenged the admission of a recorded telephone
conversation among several unindicted co-conspirators. Their
challenge included the argument that the conversations were not
in furtherance of the no-show scheme at issue there. Id. at 630.
The conversations consisted of statements “trying to get their
stories straight about what their jobs entailed in anticipation of
a government investigation.” Id. at 625. Defendants argued that
the conversations were inadmissible because their purpose was
“to conceal the declarants’ participation in the conspiracy at a
time when the declarants were no longer conspirators, having
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terminated their involvement.” Id. at 630.
We rejected that argument explaining:
“[i]f the acts of concealment amount to nothing
more than (1) a criminal conspiracy which is
carried out in secrecy; (2) a continuation of the
secrecy after the accomplishment of the crime;
and (3) desperate attempts to cover up after the
crime begins to come to light then declarations
made during an agreement to conceal are indeed
not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. (citation and quotation omitted). However, we recognized in
Pecora that the Supreme Court has cautioned:
“[b]y no means does this mean that acts of
concealment can never have significance in
furthering a criminal conspiracy. But a vital
distinction must be made between acts of
concealment done in furtherance of the main
criminal objectives of the conspiracy, and acts of
concealment done after these central objectives
have been attained, for the purpose only of
covering up after the crime.”
Pecora, 798 F.2d at 630 (quoting Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957)). We concluded that the recorded
conversations in Pecora were admissible against the defendants
because “concealment of the existence of the conspiracy enabled
the defendants to continue their illegal payoff scheme for two
21

more years . . .”. Pecora, 798 F.2d at 631.
As quoted earlier, here Ali told Rasool:
I just don’t want to do anything right now with
Sayeeda and them and jeopardize what we got
with the college, you know. Cause you know they
be the one’s to be calling and saying they ain’t
nobody there at this time go check the, you know
what, I know they’d do that.
App. 134-37. Thus, Ali is cautioning Rasool not to upset a
teacher at the School (“Sayeeda”) because that teacher might tell
CCP (“the college”) that there are no ABE classes being taught
at the School (“ain’t nobody there at this time”).

Ali is

obviously concerned that if they upset or anger Sayeeda in any
way, Sayeeda might report the fact that the School is empty
when ABE classes should have been in session, thus revealing
the “no show” scheme. Since it is clear that the purpose behind
these statements was to conceal that scheme so that it could
continue, we conclude that they were made in furtherance of it.
Moreover, our conclusion that Ali’s statements to conceal
the conspiracy were in furtherance of it is not undermined by the
fact that the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing
22

on Weaver’s motion in limine.

Even if Rasool was not a

member of the conspiracy, Ali’s efforts to conceal the scheme
were clearly intended to further it. See Reyes, 798 F.2d at 384.
As we have explained, statements made to inform others
of the status of a conspiracy only further the conspiracy if the
addressees are also interested in the status of the conspiracy.
See Ammar, F.2d at 252; see also Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 846.
Conversely, statements made for the purpose of concealing a
conspiracy can further the conspiracy regardless of whether the
addressee is a co-conspirator. Although jurors may not interpret
this statement as an effort to concealment, the government has
at least satisfied the “in furtherance” requirement of Rule
801(d)(2)(E) and is therefore entitled to have the jury consider
this portion of the September 4 conversation.
Thus, Weaver’s attempt to define the September 4
conversation as merely being Ali’s “complaints” about Weaver
is not persuasive. Appellee’s Br. at 9. Weaver attempts to
buttress this argument by relying on the reasoning in United
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States v. Licausi, 167 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1999). Licausi involved
a conspiracy to rob several supermarkets and convenience
stores. One of the defendants, John Licausi, argued on appeal
that the district court had erred in admitting out-of-court
statements of one of his co-conspirators, Bernie Subocz, to a
female acquaintance, Lori Munroe, because they were not in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 50.
Subocz had returned from a crime spree in Ohio when he
told Monroe about several robberies he and his crew had
attempted that had been botched for various reasons. The court
agreed with Licausi that the statements were inadmissible
because “[a]ll but one were made after the crimes they described
took place, and they do not appear to have yielded significant
enough information to constitute reports to a coconspirator,
assuming Munroe could be considered as such.” Id. The court
also concluded that the statements “appear[ed] . . . to be
instances where Subocz was “merely blowing off steam or
venting anxiety” or simply avoiding an argument with his
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girlfriend.
Here, even if we were to concede that some of Ali’s
statements during the September 4 conversation can be fairly
characterized as “merely blowing off steam or venting anxiety,”
the bulk of her statements are qualitatively different than those
in Licausi. All but one of the statements in Licausi were made
after the crimes were committed, and were obviously not
intended to conceal prospective criminal activity. Accordingly,
the statements were not in furtherance of a conspiracy. See id.
Conversely, as we have explained, Ali’s statement to
Rasool concerned the need to proceed with caution in order to
prevent revelation of the scheme that would result from the
discovery of empty classrooms and require an explanation of
how the proceeds were being used.
D. Admissibility of Rasool’s Statements
The government appears primarily interested in admitting
Ali’s statements during the September 4 conversation.
However, if the government intends to introduce Rasool’s
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statements against Weaver under the co-conspirator exception,
it must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Rasool
was also a conspirator. As we have noted, the government never
had a chance to establish Rasool’s membership in the
conspiracy. Of course, in addition to establishing Rasool’s role
in the conspiracy, the government must also satisfy the other
requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See Ellis, 156 F.3d at 496.
E. Relevance of the September 4 Conversation
The district court also ruled the September 4 conversation
irrelevant. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines “relevant
evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”

Fed. R. Evid. 401.

Here, Ali’s

statements to Rasool during the September 4 conversation
confirm essential elements of the conspiratorial scheme.
Specifically, Ali informed Rasool that she was dependent on
Weaver for the scheme to continue and that Weaver requested
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half of the School’s proceeds from the scheme.

Ali also

instructed Rasool not to upset Sayeeda and thereby jeopardize
the scheme, as we have just explained.
It is, of course, ultimately for the jury to interpret those
statements.. However, they are certainly relevant to the charges
against Weaver because Ali’s statements to Rasool tend to make
it more probable than not that Weaver knew about the scheme
to defraud CCP and was involved in it. Accordingly, the district
court erred in finding the September 4 conversation irrelevant.
In conclusion, we will remand for the district court to
provide the government with the opportunity to present evidence
in support of its allegation that Rasool was a co-conspirator. We
recognize that “the control of the order of proof at trial [for
admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)] is a matter
committed to the discretion of the trial judge,” Ammar, 714 F.2d
at 246, and leave it to the court to decide whether to: (1) conduct
a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Weaver’s motion in limine; or
(2) conditionally admit the challenged conversation “subject to
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the requirement that the government make [its Rule
801(d)(2)(E)] showing by the close of its case,” id. at 247. See
id. (noting that the latter procedure should be “carefully
considered and sparingly utilized”) (quoting United States v.
Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 457 (3d Cir. 1979)).
After hearing the relevant evidence, whether at a pretrial hearing
or during the trial, the district court will then be able to
determine whether the

government has proven

by a

preponderance of the evidence that the portion of Ali’s
statements to Rasool informing her of the status of the
conspiracy are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
If the evidence shows that Rasool was, as the government
claims, a co-conspirator in the charged conspiracy, that portion
of the conversation would be admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). If, on the other hand, the evidence shows that
Rasool had no involvement in the charged conspiracy, the
district court should grant Weaver’s motion with respect to that
portion of the conversation only. However, regardless of the
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district court’s findings in respect to Rasool’s involvement in the
conspiracy, Ali’s statements to Rasool regarding Sayeeda and
concealing

the

conspiracy are

admissible

under

Rule

801(d)(2)(E).
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the district
court’s order granting Weaver’s motion in limine and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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